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I. Introduction
“Copy, acquire, and kill” might sound like a top-secret military
strategy.1 In reality, Facebook’s critics use this catchphrase to
describe the tech conglomerate’s strategy to remain a “gatekeeper”
in the digital economy.2 Facebook’s co-founder and CEO Mark
Zuckerberg once admitted that he aims to “neutrali[z]e the
compet[ition]” when it comes to mergers and acquisitions.3 Further,
Facebook was accused of threatening Instagram’s founder, Kevin
Systrom, by saying Facebook would go into “destroy mode” if
Instagram tried to prevent Facebook’s acquisition of the social
media platform in 2014.4 The Federal Trade Commission’s antitrust
case against Zuckerberg brought worldwide attention to the threat

† University of North Carolina School of Law, Class of 2022. Symposium Editor, North
Carolina Journal of International Law.
1 Samuel Stolton, Facebook Accused of ‘Copy, Acquire, and Kill’ Tactics in US
Antitrust Hearing, EURACTIV (July 30, 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital
/news/facebook-accused-of-copy-acquire-and-kill-tactics-in-us-antitrust-hearing/
[https://perma.cc/7B9S-9HTA].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
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posed to the “digital economy” by “Big Tech,” including Facebook,
Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, and Google.5
Although the European Union (the “EU”) and other government
and national bodies attempted to implement more stringent
regulations on technology companies, the United States is not
known for following the same level of oversight.6 The EU is
currently trying to change this through a legislative “package” that
will address anticompetitive behaviors that stifle competition within
the technology community.7 These new laws include the Digital
Services Act (“DSA”) and the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) that
were formally introduced in 2020.8
This Note will discuss both Big Tech regulation efforts in the
United States compared to the European Union and the European
Union’s new movement to rein in the gatekeepers of the tech
industry. Part II will examine current Big Tech regulation efforts in
the United States and recent attempts at penalizing major players in
the digital economy. Part III will examine current Big Tech
regulation efforts within the European Union, with an emphasis on
the EU’s history as a leader in Big Tech regulation efforts. Part IV
discusses the introduction of the legislative package encompassing
the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act and their
intended purposes. Parts V and VI examine how the United States
can and should increase its tech industry regulation by incorporating
certain provisions of the Digital Markets Act and Digital Services
Act, as well as how the United States can improve in areas where
the DMA and DSA may fall short. Finally, Part VII provides
conclusion highlighting how the United States can follow the EU’s
legislative lead to promote user data privacy rights and competition
in the digital economy.

5 See id. These five companies, Meta (Facebook), Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, and
Alphabet (Google) are known as the “Big Five.”
6 See Zoe Strozewski, U.S. Lags in Policing Big Tech Due to Companies Being
Homegrown, Expert Says, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.newsweek.com/uslags-policing-big-tech-due-companies-being-homegrown-expert-says-1647080
[https://perma.cc/YK6V-SB25].
7 Ryan Browne, Europe Tries to Set the Global Narrative on Regulating Big Tech,
CNBC (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/16/europe-tries-to-set-the-globalnarrative-on-regulating-big-tech.html [perma.cc/6B7V-526Q].
8 See The Digital Services Act Package, EUR. COMM’N (Mar. 3, 2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/digital-services-act-package
[perma.cc/F4QL-FE26].
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II. Current U.S. Regulations Targeting Big Tech
“Senator, we run ads.”9 In July of 2020, the CEOs of tech giants
including Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Apple, testified before
members of Congress.10 Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah questioned
Zuckerberg on Facebook’s operation and at one point asked him,
“So, how do you sustain a business model in which users don’t pay
for your service?”11 While Facebook may not charge its users,
Facebook uses its “market power” to generate revenue in three
distinct ways.12 First, advertisers that target Facebook’s users
constitute Facebook’s primary source of income.13 Second, users
pay for access to Facebook with their own data.14 Third, Facebook
revenue is generated by its “growth strategy,” which involves
buying any and all competitors, effectively reduces choice and
innovation for its users and advertisers regarding social media
platforms.15
After many weeks of Congressional testimony by Big Tech
CEOs, the attorneys general of 46 U.S. states and the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) filed a lawsuit against Facebook for anticompetitive behavior on December 9, 2020.16 In addition to the
questions surrounding Facebook’s handling of users’ private data,
the behavior at issue is Facebook’s “growth strategy,” which
includes using its market power to buy competitors and essentially
squash any competition in the marketplace.17 Two of the most
significant examples include Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram

9 Shannon Liao, 11 Weird and Awkward Moments From Two Days of Mark
Zuckerberg’s Congressional Hearing, VERGE (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.theverge.com
/2018/4/11/17224184/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-congress-senators
[https://perma.cc/8EEV-DQQR].
10 Facebook Antitrust Battle Escalates Tension Between Government, Big Tech,
CONVERSATION (Jan. 11, 2021), https://theconversation.com/facebook-antitrust-battleescalates-tensions-between-government-big-tech-151959
[https://perma.cc/MR54T4MT] [hereinafter Facebook Antitrust Battle].
11 Liao, supra note 9.
12 Facebook Antitrust Battle, supra note 10.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See id.
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in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014.18 As the lawsuit claims, these
acquisitions significantly reduced user and advertiser choice for
social media platforms.19 At the resolution of this suit—whenever
that may be—the FTC is hoping to obtain an injunction that would
require Facebook to obtain permission before acquiring any other
companies or potential competitors and prohibit the social media
giant from inflicting restrictive conditions on software developers.20
While the FTC and the federal government’s recent actions
against Facebook are a step in the right direction for the United
States’ regulation of the digital market, the United States has a
reputation for giving tech giants nothing more than a “slap on the
wrist” for their transgressions.21 For example, before the FTC case
against Facebook, the U.S. government “merely appealed to
Facebook’s ‘greater responsibility’” while applauding it as an
“American success story.”22 However, this proceeding represents a
shift toward “align[ing] the United States with a global movement”
aimed at regulating Big Tech more heavily.23 This shift is
encouraging, but the United States has a long way to go to catch up
with its peers in terms of its oversight of Big Tech and the digital
economy. Case in point, since 2016, the social media conglomerate
has been subject to over 80 hearings globally.24
III.

The EU’s Efforts Against Big Tech
Although the United States has historically given technology
companies like Facebook nothing more than a stern scolding for its
anticompetitive behavior,25
the European Union has taken
legitimate actions to hold these companies accountable. For
example, Facebook was penalized upwards of $123 million U.S.
dollars by the EU for misleading its regulators during Facebook’s

18 FTC Sues Facebook for Illegal Monopolization, FTC (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-sues-facebook-illegalmonopolization [https://perma.cc/RC8K-E9NH] [hereinafter FTC].
19 Facebook Antitrust Battle, supra note 10.
20 FTC, supra note 18.
21 See Facebook Antitrust Battle, supra note 10.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 See id.
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acquisition of WhatsApp.26 The EU also initiated its own
investigation into Facebook’s data practices to assess whether its
handling of user data violated anticompetition law.27
Further, in early 2020, the European Commission (the
“Commission”) heightened its inquiry into accusations that
Facebook used users’ data to suppress competition in the
marketplace.28 Specifically, these claims allege that Facebook,
through its purchase of a “virtual-private-network app,” Onavo,
allowed developers to view consumer use of competing apps.29 This
practice gave Facebook “intelligence on competitors before they
became major threats.”30 Although Facebook’s lawyers were able
to reduce the scope of the Commission’s probe, Facebook was
required to provide documents such as emails and chat logs
regarding the Onavo acquisition.31 This investigation is just one
example of the EU’s examination of Facebook’s use and
monetization of user data in terms of anticompetitive behavior. This
type of investigation, however, is not limited to Facebook.
The Commission initiated antitrust inquiries into “Apple App
Store and Apple Pay practices” in June of 2020.32 Margrethe
Vestager, the EU’s Competition Chief, decided to take a closer look
at Apple’s App Store policies after Spotify and Rakuten complained
that Apple uses its App Store to stamp out competition.33 Spotify
claimed that Apple’s App Store promoted its own Apple Music
service over other music services, thus limiting consumer choice.34
Similarly, Rakuten’s complaint accused Apple of violating EU
competition laws by “promoting its own Apple Books service”
26 Sam Schechner, Emily Glazer & Valentina Pop, EU Deepens Antitrust Inquiry
Into Facebook’s Data Practices, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-deepens-antitrust-inquiry-into-facebooks-data-practices11580994001 [https://perma.cc/HX8H-GXWW].
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See Tom Warren, EU Opens Apple Antitrust Investigations Into App Store and
Apple
Pay
Practices,
VERGE
(June
16,
2020,
6:35
A.M.),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/16/21292651/apple-eu-antitrust-investigation-appstore-apple-pay [perma.cc/ND8M-U6WW].
33 Id.
34 Id.
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while charging a “thirty percent commission” on other “ebooks.”35
Furthermore, the Commission is looking into Apple’s obstruction
of “Near Field Communication functionality,” (“NFC”) which
allows for the communication between two electronic devices over
a certain distance and inhibits users’ ability to make mobile
payments from applications other than Apple Pay.36 This
investigation began not long after Germany passed legislation
requiring Apple to permit other companies to use its NFC
functionality.37
Despite recent attention being focused on Facebook and Apple,
Amazon and Google have not escaped the EU’s watchful eye. In
November of 2020, the Commission notified Amazon that it had
violated antitrust laws by using “independent sellers’” data for its
own benefit.38 Third party seller data includes data related to
shipping, sellers’ revenues, consumer claims on products, and the
number of products ordered and shipped.39 Furthermore, the
Commission is also investigating the alleged “preferential
treatment” of Amazon’s own sellers and sellers that use Amazon’s
dedicated transportation and logistical services.40 Although the
EU’s investigations into Facebook, Apple, and Amazon are
relatively recent, the EU’s battle against Google began nearly a
decade ago.41
This decade-long investigation into Google resulted in an
approximately $10 billion fine against the search engine for using
its powerful position in the market to stifle competition.42 However,
today, several years after the imposition of this substantial fine, very
few competitors have joined the market alongside Google.43
35

Id.
Id.
37 Id.
38 Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for the Use of
Non-Public Independent Seller Data and Opens Second Investigation Into its e-Commerce
Business Practices, EUR. COMM’N (Nov. 10, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/commission
/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2077 [perma.cc/J6FA-BFGP].
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Jeanne Whalen, Europe Fined Google Nearly $10 Billion for Antitrust Violations,
But Little Has Changed, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/technology/2020/11/10/eu-antitrust-probe-google/ [perma.cc/VLL5-X9AN].
42 Id.
43 Id.
36
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Experts blame the EU for allowing Google to “fix” the problem
themselves.44 For example, one of Google’s solutions was to charge
“rival search engines” a fee to show as an option on Android
phones.45 U.S. officials, who filed their own antitrust case against
Google in October of 2020, also criticized this outcome.46 However,
the EU felt it “didn’t have the political standing to impose tougher
measures, such as a breakup, on an American company.”47 This
belief, if true and held by other political entities, further signals that
the United States’ time to step in, and step up, in the world of Big
Tech regulation is long overdue. Despite its “failure” to adequately
curb the anticompetitive behavior of Google, the EU is preparing to
make strides in its regulation of the digital economy.
IV.

The DSA and DMA
The introduction of these new rules are part of a European
“digital strategy” known as “Shaping Europe’s Digital Future.”48
This digital strategy highlights three overarching goals: developing
technology that “makes a difference in people’s daily lives,”
creating a “fair and competitive” market for technology companies,
and creating an environment in which citizens can trust the way
their data is handled.49 An integral part of this strategy is known as
the “Digital Services Act package.”50 The Digital Services Act
package encompasses the Digital Services Act (“DSA”) and the
Digital Markets Act (“DMA”).51 These laws will apply throughout
the EU and govern its digital services.52 Two main goals of the DSA
and DMA include: (1) “to create a safer digital space in which the
fundamental rights of all users of digital services are protected,” and
(2) “to establish a level playing field to foster innovation, growth,
and competitiveness, both in the European Single Market and

44

Id.
Id.
46 Id.
47 See Whalen, supra note 41.
48 Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, Factsheet, EUR. COMM’N (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/shapingeurope-digital-future_en.
49 See id.
50 Digital Services Act Package, supra note 8.
51 Id.
52 Id.
45
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globally.”53 Thus, the DSA and DMA package specifically targets
major technology companies that are considered to be the
“gatekeepers” of the internet, like Facebook, Google, Amazon, and
Apple.54
The European Commission published the first draft of the DSA
and DMA package on December 15, 2020.55 However, it was
initially announced in July 2019 by Ursula von der Leyen, a German
politician and physician who currently serves as the president of the
European Commission.56 As previously mentioned, the DSA forms
a significant piece of the European Digital Strategy, “Shaping
Europe’s digital future.”57 Although the DSA and the DMA are
often referred to as a “legislative package,” both pieces of
legislation play independent and important roles in this new
strategy.58
The Digital Services Act (“DSA”) is intended to apply widely
across “the digital ecosystem” to “networking sites,” “social media
platforms,” “online market places,” “app stores,” and “hosting
services.”59 The rules and regulations created by the DSA apply to
service providers established within the EU as well as those based
outside of the EU that still offer services to EU residents.60 Service
providers based outside of the EU will also be required to elect an
EU-based legal representative who is responsible for overseeing
that the new regulations are complied with.61 The elected EU-based
legal representatives can be held liable for “any non-compliance.”62
Although the DSA targets an array of service providers, it places
more stringent responsibilities on “very large platforms.”63 The
53

Id.
See id.
55 See The Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act: A new era for online
regulation within Europe, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS DIGIT. TMT & SOURCING NOTES
(Dec. 15, 2020), https://hsfnotes.com/tmt/2020/12/15/the-digital-services-act-and-digitalmarkets-act-a-new-era-for-online-regulation-within-europe/#page=1
[https://perma.cc/D38G-H9UP] [hereinafter DIGIT. TMT & SOURCING NOTES].
56 See id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See DIGIT. TMT & SOURCING NOTES, supra note 55.
61 See id.
62 See id. (emphasis added).
63 Id.
54
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DSA defines “large” as those service providers with over forty-five
million customers, or about “ten percent of the EU’s population.”64
Some of the key provisions of the DSA specifically involve
regulating advertising and platform transparency, regulating illegal
content, improving the “traceability of business users and illegal
goods,” and greater enforcement measures and fines.65 In regard to
advertising, all platforms showing ads, regardless of size, must take
measures to ensure their users “can identify in a clear and
unambiguous manner” that the content shown is an advertisement,
for whom the advertisement is meant, and “meaningful
information” about why such an audience is being shown that
particular advertisement.66 Internet platforms will also need to
verify all third party vendors that use their services for purposes of
traceability.67
Finally, just as their non-EU counterparts are required to elect a
legal representative within the EU, EU-based platforms must
designate a “Digital Services Coordinator.”68 This individual will
serve to see that the EU-based platform complies with the terms of
the DSA.69 The Digital Services Coordinator will also be
responsible for reporting the number of platform users in the EU,
and specifically keeping the list of “very large platforms” providing
services in the EU, updated every six months.70 Service providers
that violate the DSA will be fined “up to six percent of its annual
income.”71 Although the DSA specifically addresses the behavior
of digital service providers in terms of advertising and transparency
about how user data is handled, the DMA aims to address
competition issues within the digital economy.72
The main purpose of the Digital Markets Act (the “DMA”) is to
manage the consequences that result from allowing platforms such

64

See id.
See DIGIT. TMT & SOURCING NOTES, supra note 55.
66 Id.
67 See id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See DIGIT. TMT & SOURCING NOTES, supra note 55.
71 See id.
72 See Alexandre de Streel, Digital Markets Act: Policy Choices and Conditions for
Success, PROMARKET (Jan. 13, 2021), https://promarket.org/2021/01/13/digital-marketsact-explainer-european-regulation-big-tech/ [https://perma.cc/2D27-9V4F].
65
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as Facebook to act as “gatekeepers.”73 The DMA has set out a threepart test to determine which service providers will meet this criteria
for the purposes of the Act.74 A service provider will be considered
a gatekeeper if for three consecutive years, they have a turnover
equal to or greater than “€6.5 billion ($7.9 billion) or market
capitalization of at least €65 billion ($79 billion),” “presence in at
least three” European Union Member States, and “more than fortyfive million monthly active end users” and “ten thousand active
annual business users.”75 Practices that are “‘clearly unfair,’ such
as blocking users from un-installing any pre-installed software or
apps,” are also prohibited under the DMA.76 Fines as high as ten
percent of the provider’s global profits are possible if found in
violation of DMA provisions.77 For repeat offenders, “sanctions
may also involve structural remedies” to their business practices.78
Some policymakers have questioned how the DSA and DMA
will coincide with the General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”), the EU’s data privacy and security law. Commentators
have described the GDPR as “the toughest privacy and security law
in the world.”79 This legislation came into effect on May 25, 2018,
and “imposes obligations onto organizations anywhere [in the
world], so long as they target or collect data related to people in the
EU.”80 While some critics present worthy points of skepticism,
there are multiple reasons why the DSA and DMA properly coexist
with the GDPR. First, despite its significance in the world of data
privacy legislation, legislators acknowledge that the GDPR does not
address the role that data plays in promoting competition in the
digital economy; the DMA, specifically, aims to remedy this.81
Secondly, the GDPR favors the exchange of data within companies
73

See DIGIT. TMT & SOURCING NOTES, supra note 55.
Streel, supra note 72.
75 Id.
76 DIGIT. TMT & SOURCING NOTES, supra note 55.
77 See id.
78 Id.
79 Ben Wolford, What is GDPR, the EU’s New Data Protection Law?, GDPR.EU,
https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2022) [https://perma.cc/NH5V-BSYF].
80 Id.
81 Aline Blankertz & Julian Jaursch, What the European DSA and DMA Proposals
Mean for Online Platforms, BROOKINGS (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu
/techstream/what-the-european-dsa-and-dma-proposals-mean-for-online-platforms/
[https://perma.cc/7LUE-8YL9].
74
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over the exchange of data between companies.82 This gives
companies that provide services across a wider area an advantage
over those with a more limited range.83 The DMA will also
constrain the extensiveness of “datasets” that companies like
Facebook can create using only their own users’ data by restricting
such intra-company exchange of data.84 Finally, Jeroen Terstegge,
the International Association of Privacy Professionals Netherlands
Country Leader, claims that “ . . . It will be DSA first and GDPR
second.”85 Thus, the DSA and DMA have been written to support
and bolster the provisions of the GDPR, not to compete, even
though it is yet to be seen how these laws will work in conjunction
with each other in practice.
V. What can the U.S. Learn from the Digital Markets Act?
In February of 2021, United States Senator Amy Klobuchar (DMN) announced her new legislation that will attempt to regulate Big
Tech in the United States—the Competition and Antitrust Law
Enforcement Reform Act (CALERA).86 Klobuchar, who currently
chairs the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy
and Consumer Rights, believes this new legislation is “the first step
to overhauling and modernizing our laws so we can effectively
promote competition and protect American consumers.”87
CALERA will address the gaps in U.S. antitrust law by increasing
funds for government agencies including the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) and the Department of Justice’s Antitrust
Division, “strengthen prohibitions against anticompetitive mergers”
through restoration of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, prohibit
“dominant companies” from partaking in anticompetitive

82

Id.
Id.
84 Id.
85 Jennifer Bryant, European Commission Expected to Unveil Digital Services Act in
December, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS. (Dec. 1, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/europeancommission-expected-to-unveil-digital-services-act-in-december/
[https://perma.cc/XEF5-9TMG].
86 Press Release, Sen. Amy Klobuchar, Senator Klobuchar Introduces Sweeping Bill
to Promote Competition and Improve Antitrust Enforcement (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/2/senator-klobucharintroduces-sweeping-bill-to-promote-competition-and-improve-antitrust-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/4M86-FKXW] [hereinafter Klobuchar]; S. 225, 117th Cong. (2021).
87 Klobuchar, supra note 86.
83
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behaviors, and administer further measures to strengthen the
American antitrust regime.88
While CALERA represents a long-awaited step from the U.S. to
get involved in the world’s efforts to regulate Big Tech, U.S.
legislators should consider taking some cues from the European
Union’s Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act. These two
pieces of EU legislation also address anticompetitive-adjacent
behaviors of tech industry “gatekeepers” in addition to their
anticompetitive behaviors like buying up small potential
competitors.89 Specifically, the DMA prohibits platforms from
“requiring their business customers to use their payment
processors.”90 Congress could similarly address the “ancillary
services” that also promote big tech’s anticompetitive agenda.91
These may include prohibiting data mixing; establishing “real
penalties and structural remedies;” and prohibiting practices such as
“forced single sign-on,” “cross-tying,” and “lock-ins.”92
Data mixing is a practice where gatekeepers connect the data
they collect on their customers with the “commercially available
data” collected by their business customers and data brokers.93 They
thereby reveal otherwise private information about their customers
for a competitive edge.94 By addressing practices like data mixing,
governments and legislative bodies can curb these anticompetitive
behaviors while also protecting customer data.
Practices such as “forced single sign-on” force users to use their
personal login information, while “cross-tying” compels customers
to register for the business’s own “ancillary services” like signing
up for a Gmail account.95 “Lock-ins” include another practice
whereby companies prohibit independent users from “switching

88

Id.
Cory Doctorow & Christoph Schmon, The EU’s Digital Markets Act: There is A
Lot to Like, but Room for Improvement, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/12/eus-digital-markets-act-there-lot-roomimprovement [https://perma.cc/8KZ4-UFSB].
90 See id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See id.
94 See What is Data Blending?, ALTAIR, https://www.altair.com/what-is-datablending/ [https://perma.cc/7234-GFMC].
95 Doctorow & Schmon, supra note 89.
89
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away from default apps.”96 Gatekeepers are also charged with
allowing competing “third party app stores” to use their “operating
systems” under the DMA.97 By following the EU’s lead in
prohibiting these practices, the U.S. can encourage competition
within the tech industry and provide customers with greater choice
when it comes to the services they use. By preventing companies
from requiring their customers to choose services that are connected
with their own, customers will have the opportunity to explore thirdparty apps and services that are otherwise taken out of consideration
the moment a customer chooses to use a gatekeeper’s services.
Civil penalties under CALERA for anticompetitive behavior
will include up to fifteen percent of an entity’s U.S. revenues for the
prior year, or thirty percent of the entity’s revenues for the duration
the prohibited activity occurred.98 This is a notable change from the
United States’ history of antitrust enforcement, where injunctive
relief was commonly the only action taken against big tech in
antitrust actions.99 However, the bill fails to provide further
instruction on how civil penalties should be established in cases
such as these.100 Establishing clear guidelines as to the method of
determining civil penalties is a vital step in enforcing more stringent
monetary penalties on big tech companies. Penalties in the past
have been accused of being a mere “slap on the wrist” in comparison
to the massive revenues generated by some of these major players.101
In comparison to the “light” penalties often seen in the United
States, the DMA establishes fines for violating its provisions at up
to “ten percent of the gatekeeper’s global annual revenue.”102 It also
implements “periodic penalty payments” of “up to five percent of
average global daily revenues” for recurrent or continuous
violations of DMA provisions.103 Additionally, the DMA calls for
96

Id.
Id.
98 Jonathan Gleklen et al., United States: Analysis of the Proposed Competition and
Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, MONDAQ (Feb. 25, 2021),
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/antitrust-eu-competition-/1041218/analysis-ofthe-proposed-competition-and-antitrust-law-enforcement-reform-act-of-2021
[https://perma.cc/N7S3-99DW].
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See Facebook Antitrust Battle, supra note 10.
102 Doctorow & Schmon, supra note 89.
103 Id.
97
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the imposition of “structural remedies” on companies who fail to
cease anticompetitive practices.104 For example, a gatekeeper who
refuses to stop a certain anticompetitive practice may be required to
“sell off” an entire fragment of their company.105 As previously
mentioned, clear and strict guidelines regarding how penalties will
be set and how penalties will increase with recurrent violations play
an important role in having the deterrent effect necessary to
discourage anticompetitive behavior.
Finally, the DMA was purposely written to be updated regularly
to reflect changes in the tech industry and market space.106 Regular
updating of this legislation allows EU legislators to implement rules
targeting smaller companies that are not currently considered
gatekeepers, but likely will be at some point in the future, as well as
provide legislators the flexibility to anticipate and resolve
anticompetitive practices that may arise.107 This ideal reflects an
acknowledgement that the tech industry and its key players are
continuously changing and evolving. These changes are reflected in
how they provide their services to customers, and also in how they
attempt to circumvent legislation such as the DMA to maintain a
competitive edge against their competitors. Being that the United
States is a significant host of tech innovation, U.S. legislators should
include a similar provision in this current or future legislation to
allow for the law to keep pace with this rapidly changing industry.
While these reflect several cues the U.S. can take from the EU
and the Digital Markets Act in terms of designing its own
legislation, there are also several stipulations in the Digital Services
Act that present an opportunity for lawmakers in the U.S. to address
specific issues within the tech industry that relate to advertising and
other content-related practices of tech companies within the social
networking sphere.
VI.

What can the U.S. Learn from the Digital Services Act?
As previously discussed, the Digital Services Act (“DSA”)
seeks to address issues surrounding advertising and platform
transparency, as well as the regulation of illegal content, and
improving the traceability of business users and legal goods of
104
105
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107
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companies who provide “online intermediary services.”108 This is a
much broader category than that targeted by the Digital Markets
Act’s “gatekeeper” classification.109 These intermediary services
include “hosting services such as cloud,” go-between services such
as “internet access providers” and “domain name registrars,” online
spaces such as “online marketplaces,” and other large online
platforms that may be likely to share prohibited or “illegal
content.”110
Under the Clayton Act, CALERA proscribes “exclusionary
conduct” that “presents an appreciable risk of harming
competition,”111 but it is uncertain if advertising practices and
illegal content regulation would fall within the purview of this
section of the new legislation. However, while these issues may not
be exclusively antitrust-related, the advertising practices of online
platforms can be considered to be anticompetitive or antitrustadjacent as well.112 Thus, while the United States might choose to
approach the issues addressed by the DSA in a separate piece of
legislation rather than within CALERA itself, the DSA still contains
some important elements that United States legislators should
consider incorporating into American law at some point.113 These
key elements of the DSA that the United States should consider
include the DSA’s broader “very large platforms” definition,
increased transparency regarding algorithms, “content moderation”
reporting, virtual complaint system, and heftier fines.114
108 See The Digital Services Act: Ensuring a Safe and Accountable Online
Environment,
EUR.
COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-20192024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-services-act-ensuring-safe-and-accountable-onlineenvironment_en (last visited Feb. 10, 2022) [https://perma.cc/BVW5-QS3M] [hereinafter
The Digital Services Act].
109 See Doctorow & Schmon, supra note 89.
110 See The Digital Services Act, supra note 108.
111 Klobuchar, supra note 86.
112 See Wilson C. Freeman & Jay B. Sykes, Antitrust and Big Tech, Congressional
Research Service (Sept. 11, 2019) https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45910.pdf (“In May 2019,
the Senate and Judiciary Committee held a hearing to investigate privacy and competition
issues in the digital advertising industry.”).
113 Klobuchar, supra note 86.
114 See Christoph Schmon & Karen Gullo, Eur. Comm’ns. Proposed Digit. Servs. Act
Got Several Things Right, But Improvements are Necessary to Put Users in Control, ELEC.
FRONTIER. FOUND. (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/12/europeancommissions-proposed-regulations-require-platforms-let-users-appeal
[https://perma.cc/UC8V-2KTY].
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First, in comparison to the Digital Market Act, the DSA creation
of the “very large platforms” category significantly broadens the
number and type of companies affected by the new regulations.115
This category encompasses newer faces in the social media world
such as “TikTok, Twitter, and Snapchat” in addition to the original
“social media giants” like Facebook.116 According to proponents of
this new definition, the broader category better recognizes the
significant societal impact that even smaller technology and social
media platforms can have in the spread of misinformation.117
However, while the DSA significantly broadens the category of
online platform subject to its legislation, the DSA is not a “blanket”
approach.118 In fact, the DSA can give the United States a lesson in
“asymmetric” regulation, the movement toward imposing different
regulations on different types of companies.119 For example, in
comparison to social media sites, a cloud service provider would
have different obligations in regard to monitoring information
online.120 This movement from “one-size-fits-all” to “asymmetric,”
and more tailored regulation is also arguably a reflection of the
evolution in the internet and its rapid, continuous change.
The next three elements of the DSA reflect its goal of increasing
the transparency within online platforms regarding their advertising
and content moderation practices.121 These elements include
“algorithm disclosure” requirements, mandatory content
moderation reporting, and the “implementation of a virtual
complaint system.”122 To comply with the algorithm disclosure
provision of the DSA, online service providers must be able to show

115 See Juan Londoño, The EU’s Digital Services Act: A Primer, AM. ACTION FORUM
(Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/the-eus-digital-servicesact-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/P9DJ-2CNH].
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 Bruna Martins dos Santos & David Morar, Four Lessons for U.S. Legislators from
the EU Digital Services Act, BROOKINGS (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog
/techtank/2021/01/06/four-lessons-for-u-s-legislators-from-the-eu-digital-services-act/
[https://perma.cc/R4HV-P4NU].
119 See Emily Birnbaum, Five Things US Companies Need to Know About the New
EU Rules, PROTOCOL (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.protocol.com/companies-know-neweu-rules [https://perma.cc/H5zy-B8DU].
120 See Londoño, supra note 115.
121 See id.
122 See id.
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EU regulators how they use algorithms to moderate content and
target particular users with certain advertisements.123 This provision
also gives the European Commission power to conduct inspections
of the company or platform’s algorithms.124 A platform could be
fined as much as “ten percent of their total revenue in the fiscal
year” if they fail or refuse to consent to an inspection.125 As
previously mentioned, the lack of transparency surrounding
targeted advertisement via the use of algorithms is something for
which large platforms like Facebook have been criticized.126
Increasing the transparency of such practices, for the user and
digital economy’s benefit, are important topics for tech policy
advocates and should be essential to any U.S. legislation that
attempts to regulate these practices within the technology industry.
Per request by the European Commission, platforms are
required to provide the Commission with reports on the
transparency of their “content-moderation efforts” under the
DSA.”127 Information such as the “average time of compliance on
an order” for content moderation, the “number of complaints
received,” and any content removed must be included in the
“transparency reports” provided to the Commission.128
Coincidentally, the requirement that online platforms implement
“effective internal complaint-handling systems” is the next key
element of the DSA.129 This mechanism not only allows users to
file complaints if they identify illegal content, but it also allows
users to file complaints if they oppose “certain content-moderation
practices.”130 More specifically, an effective complaint system must
provide users with the opportunity to file complaints against
“decisions to remove or disable access” to certain information,
“decisions to suspend or terminate the provision of service” wholly
or partially, and “decisions to suspend or terminate” a user’s
account.131 Complaint systems should also be “user-friendly” and
123
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allow the company to provide a timely response to complaints.132
These and other practices mandated by the DSA are just a few
examples of how potential U.S. legislation could promote greater
transparency within the digital economy. However, there are
several criticisms of these elements in the current draft of the
DSA.133
The first of these criticisms is the ambiguous language requiring
complaint systems to be “user-friendly” and for online platforms to
respond in a “timely manner.”134 Without more guidance,
companies are left to their own devices in constructing complaint
platforms that are sufficiently easy for users to navigate.135
Conversely, users must rely on the goodwill of the platforms to
create complaint systems that are easy to figure out and use.
Without further guidance, companies could purposely establish
platforms with low user operability simply to make it more difficult
for users to file complaints. Furthermore, the ambiguity regarding
the time in which companies are required to respond to these
complaints could cause problems for both platforms and users.136
The absence of clear guidance could leave room for regulatory
intervention where online platforms are given very little time to
respond to such complaints.137 Again, by contrast, it could also
allow companies to give themselves overly-generous deadlines
which would be less beneficial for the users.138 Thus, while the
concepts presented in the DSA to address the lack of transparency
in Big Tech represent a step in the right direction, the United States
should consider providing more concrete requirements and
recommendations in future legislation.
The final provision from which the United States can take
pointers is the monetary penalty structure established by the DSA.
Platforms who fail to comply with the stipulations in the DSA can
be subject to fines as high as six percent of global revenue for just
their first offense.139 Fines for repeat offenses can be as high as ten
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percent of global revenue.140 As previously discussed, the United
States failed to impose sufficiently deterrent monetary penalties on
companies like Facebook, Google, and Amazon in the past
according to critics.141 For example, Facebook was fined a “record”
five billion dollars as a result of the “Cambridge Analytica data
breach.”142 While five billion dollars sounds huge to the average
individual, critics equate five billion dollars to a parking ticket143
for a company whose market capitalization value reached $1 trillion
in 2021.144 However, the potential fines posed by the DSA and
DMA could pose significant disruptions to the value of gatekeepers
in the digital market.145 The United States, who has been criticized
of imposing proportionally nominal fines, should emulate the
DSA’s more significant penalty structure. The potential fines must
be impactful enough to deter companies of every size, but especially
the large gatekeepers of the industry, from participating in
anticompetitive behaviors. It is essential that the United States, or
any country hoping to enter the world of Big Tech regulation,
includes provisions to protect and promote competition in the digital
market in addition to increasing the potential fines of offenders. As
they say, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”
VII. Conclusion
In conclusion, despite that Big Tech has gone virtually
unregulated in the United States for too long, the EU has been a
continuous leader in global efforts to address the issues surrounding
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the digital economy.146 The EU is currently planning to strengthen
their regulation of Big Tech by introducing a legislative package
encompassing the Digital Services Act (“DSA”) and the Digital
Markets Act (“DMA”).147 These two pieces of legislation seek to
address anticompetition behaviors within the technology
community.148 While the DSA and DMA have not yet been
officially enacted into law, the United States could enact similar
provisions in future legislation as it seeks to bolster Big Tech
regulation in the United States.
The United States might be considered a leader in many areas
of science, medicine, and technology, but its regulation of Big Tech
has lagged behind other governmental bodies such as the EU. The
introduction of CALERA is a positive sign that the U.S. intends to
step up to the plate when it comes to reining in Big Tech. The
United States prides itself on being a supporter of innovation and
entrepreneurship, but legislators must remember that proper
regulation of large industries and the main players within those
industries will bolster competition and innovation in the technology
industry, not hinder it.
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